Business-Administration People | All Faculty | Operations Management

Susan I. Cohen

Associate Professor Emeritus of Business Administration

All Publications

Articles in Journals

Cohen, S., Loeb, M., Stark, A. 1992. Separating Controllable Performance from Non-Controllable Performance: The Case of Optimal Procurement Contracting. Management Accounting Research, 3: 291-306

Cohen, S., Loeb, M. 1990. Implicit Cost Allocation and Bidding for Contracts. Management Science, 36: 1133-1138

Cohen, S., Loeb, M. 1990. On the Optimality of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Joint Costs. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8: 405-416

Cohen, S., Loeb, M. 1989. The Demand for Cost Allocaitons: The Case of Incentive Contracts Versus Fixed-Price Contracts. Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 8: 165-180

Cohen, S., Loeb, M. 1988. Imporving Performance Through Cost Allocation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 5: 70-95

Cohen, S., Starks, L. 1988. Incdentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers. Management Science, 34: 1067-1079

Cohen, S. 1986. Truth Telling, Dominant Strategies and Iterative Groves Mechanisms. Public Choice, 51: 333-343

Cohen, S., Loeb, M. 1984. The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard. Management Science, 30: 20-24

Cohen, S., Loeb, M. 1982. Public Goods, Common Inputs and the Efficiency of Full-Cost Allocations. The Accounting Review, 57: 336-347

Cohen, S. 1980. Incentives and the Choice of Optimal Plans. The American Economic Review, 71: 756-762

Cohen, S. 1980. Incentives, Iterative Communication and Organizational Control. Journal of Economic Theory, 22: 37-55


Cohen, S., Wu, J. 1998. Why Should We Pay an Agent for Bad News?, INFORMS Conference, Montreal.

Cohen, S., Ma, S. 1995. Long Term Agency Relationships and Human Capital Investment, INFORMS Conference, New Orleans.

Cohen, S. 1994. Incentives Contracts as a Signal of the Principal's Private Information, EIASM Conference on Mathematical Models of Organizations and Decision Making, Brussels.

Cohen, S., Arvan, L. 1992. Incentive Contracts as a Signal of the Principal's Private Information, EURO/TIMS Joint International Conference, Helsinki.

Cohen, S., Starks, L. 1989. Incentive Contracts for Protfolio Managers, Institute for Quantitative Analysis in Finance, Orlando.

Monahan, G. , Cohen, S., Leatherwood, M. 1988. A Theory of Reputation and Contracting, National ORSA/TIMS Conference, Washington.

Cohen, S., Leatherwood, M., Monahan, G. 1988. A Theory of Reputation and Contracting, TIMS/ORSA, Washington.

Cohen, S., Starks, L. 1985. Incentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers, TIMS/ORSA, Boston.

Cohen, S., Loeb, M. 1984. Theory and Experiments in Decentralized Organizations, International TIMS, Copenhagen.

Cohen, S. 1981. Truth-Telling as a Dominant Strategy in an Iterative Groves Mechanism, Public Choice Society, New Orleans.

Cohen, S. 1977. Incentive Compatible Control of the Multidivisional Firm Using Iterative Decomposition Algorithms, TIMS/ORSA, New York City.

Cohen, S. 1977. Incentive Compatible Control of the Multidivisional Firm with Iterative Communication, Econometric Society, New York City.