Charles Kahn

Articles

• Jorge, J., & Kahn, C. (2020). Illiquidity as a Signal. Journal of Financial Stability, 50.
• Park, H., & Kahn, C. (2019). Collateral, Rehypothecation, and Efficiency. Journal of Financial Intermediation.
• Kahn, C. (2018). The Threat of Privacy. Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, 6 (2/3), 21-30.
• Kahn, C. (2018). Payment systems and privacy. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS REVIEW, 100 (4), 337-344.
• Kahn, C., Linares-Zegarra, J., & Stavins , J. (2017). Are there Social Spillovers in Consumers' Security Assessments of Payment Instruments? Journal of Financial Services Research, 52 (1), 5-34.
• France, V., & Kahn, C. (2016). Law as a constraint on bailouts: Emergency support for central counterparties. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 28, Issue C 22-31.
• Kahn, C., & Park, H. (2016). Collateral chains and Incentives. Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, 5 (1), 1-16.  link >
• Kahn, C., & Linares-Zegarra, J. (2016). Identity Theft and Consumer Payment Choice: Does Security Really Matter? Journal of Financial Services Research, (1).
• Kahn, C., & Carbo-Valverde, S. (2016). Payment Systems in the US and Europe: Efficiency, Soundness and Challenges. Financial Stability Journal (Bank of Spain), (30), 11-33.
• Antinolfi, G., Carapella, F., Kahn, C., Martin, A., Mills, D., & Nosal, E. (2015). Repos, Fire Sales and Bankruptcy Policy. Review of Economic Dynamics, 18 (1), 21-31.  link >
• Kahn, C. (2013). Private Payment Systems, Collateral, and Interest Rates. Annals of Finance, 9 (1), 83-114.
• Kahn, C. (2011). Comment on "Precautionary Demand and Liquidity in Payment Systems" by Gara M. Afonso and Hyun Song Shin. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 43, Supplement s2 621-623.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2009). Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 41 (5), 855-884.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2009). Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18 1-23.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2008). Credit and Identity Theft. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55 251-264.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2007). Transferability, Finality and Debt Settlement. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54 (4), 955-978.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2006). Who Should Act As Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model': A Comment. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 38 (4), 1111-1118.
• Kahn, C., McAndrews, J., & Roberds, W. (2005). Money Is Privacy. International Economic Review, 46 (2), 377-399.
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (2005). Low Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Management Science, 51 (3), 356-371.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2005). Allocating Bank Regulatory Power: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. European Economic Review, 49 (8), 2107-2136.  link >
• Kahn, C., Pennacchi, G., & Sopranzetti, B. (2005). Bank Consolidation and the Dynamics of Consumer Loan Interest Rates. Journal of Business, 78 (1, Part 2), 99-133.
• Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (2004). Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. Journal of Finance, 59 (6), 2531-2575.
• Kahn, C. (2004). Comment on 'Competition and Financial Stability' by Allen and Gale. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36 (3; part 2).
• Kahn, C., Roberds, W., & McAndrews, J. (2003). Settlement Risk under Gross and Net Settlement. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35 (4), 591-608.
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (2002). Multiunit Auctions in Which Almost Every Bid Wins. Southern Economic Journal, 68 (3), 617-31.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2002). The Economics of Payment Finality. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, 87 30-39.
• Colwell, P., & Kahn, C. (2001). Economic Functions of Referrals and Referral Fees. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 23 (3), 267-296.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2001). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 47 (2), 299-319.
• Kahn, C., Silva, E., & Ziliak, J. (2001). Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects. Economic Journal, 111 (468), 188-205.
• Kahn, C., Pennacchi, G., & Sopranzetti, B. (1999). Bank Deposit Rate Clustering: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Finance, 54 (6), 2185-2214.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 31 (3; part 2), 500-525.
• Kahn, C., & Tsoulouhas, T. (1999). Strategic Transmission of Information and Short-Term Commitment. Economic Theory, 14 (1), 131-153.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). The Design of Wholesale Payments Networks: The Importance of Incentives. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, 30-39.
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1999). Calibration of a Model of the Afternoon Effect in Cattle Auctions. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 39 (1), 113-128.
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1998). Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices. Economic Theory, 12 (2), 227-258.
• Kahn, C., & Mookherjee, D. (1998). Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts. RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (3), 443-465.
• Kahn, C. (1998). One-Stop Shopping for Settlement Services: RESPA, Referral Fees, and Consumer Reaction. Illinois Real Estate Letter.
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1998). Uniform-Price Auctions with Variable Awards. Games and Economics Behavior, 23 (1), 25-42.
• Kahn, C. (1998). Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards. Games and Economics Behavior, 23 25-42.
• Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (1998). Ownership Structure, Speculation and Shareholder Information. Journal of Finance, 53 (1), 99-130.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1998). Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives. Review of Financial Studies, 11 (4), 845-870.
• Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1996). The Efficiency of Self Regulated Payments Systems: Leaming from the Suffolk System. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28 (4), 766-797.
• Kahn, C., & Mookherjee, D. (1995). Market Failure with Moral Hazard and Side Trading. Journal of Public Economics, 58 (2), 159-184.
• Kahn, C., & Mookherjee, D. (1995). Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy. Journal of Economic Theory, 66 (1), 113-138.
• Calomiris, C., Kahn, C., & Longhofer, S. (1994). Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 26 (3), 634-674.
• Kahn, C., & Yavas, A. (1994). The Economic Role of Foreclosures. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 8 (1), 35-51.
• Kahn, C., & Silva, E. (1993). Exclusion and Moral Hazard: The Case of Identical Demand. Journal of Public Economics, 52 (2), 217-235.
• Kahn, C., & Longhofer, S. (1993). An Equilibrium Model of Quits Under Optimal Contracting. European Economic Review, 37 (6), 1203-1222.
• Kahn, C., & Reagan, P. (1993). Introducing Work Rules into Models of Wage-Employment Contracts. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 33 (3), 217-231.
• Kahn, C. (1993). The Existence and Characterization of Optimal Contracts on a Continuous State Space. Journal of Economic Theory, 59 122-144.
• Kahn, C., & Krasa, S. (1993). Non Existence and Inefficiency of Equilibria with American Options and Convertible Bonds. Economic Theory, 3 (1).
• Kahn, C. (1992). The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Coalition-Proof Equilibrium in Infinite Games. Games and Economics Behavior, 101-121.
• Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1991). The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements. American Economic Review, 81 497-513.
• Kahn, C. (1991). The Economic Role of Foreclosure Rules. Illinois Real Estate Letter, 8-11.
• Englebrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1991). Protecting the Winner: Second-Price Versus Oral Auctions. Economics Letters, 35 243-248.
• Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1990). Cooperative Arrangements for the Regulation of Banking by Banks. Illinois Business Review.
• Kahn, C., & Huberman, G. (1989). Default, Foreclosure and Strategic Renegotiation. Law and Contemporary Problems, 52 49-61.
• Huberman, G., & Kahn, C. (1988). Strategic Renegotiation. Economics Letters, 28 117-121.
• Kahn, C., & Mookherjee, D. (1988). A Competitive Efficiency Wage Model with Keynesian Features. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103 609-645.
• Kahn, C., & Huberman, G. (1988). Two-Sided Uncertainty and Up-or-Out Contracts. Journal of Labor Economics, 6 423-443.
• Huberman, G., & Kahn, C. (1988). Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation. American Economic Review, 78 (3), 471-484.
• Kahn, C., Malueg, D., & Solow, J. (1988). Erratum: The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs. Econometrica, 56 754.
• Kahn, C. (1988). The Use of Complicated Models as Explanations: A Re-examination of Williamson's Late 19th Century America. Research in Economic History, 11 185-216.
• Kahn, C. (1986). The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs. Econometrica, 54 (2), 275-294.
• Kahn, C. (1985). Optimal Severance Pay with Incomplete Information. Journal of Political Economy, 93 (3), 435-451.
• Kahn, C., & Scheinkman, J. (1985). Optimal Employment Contracts with Bankruptcy Constraints. Journal of Economic Theory, 35 (2), 343-365.
• Green, J., & Kahn, C. (1983). Wage-Employment Contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 173-187.
• Blanchard, O., & Kahn, C. (1980). The Solution of Linear Difference Models Under Rational Expectations. Econometrica, 48 1305-1311.

Book Chapters

• Kahn, C., Long, C., & Singh, M., Manmohan Singh (Ed.) (2020). Privacy Provision, Latency and the Role of Collateral. Collateral Markets and Financial Plumbing Risk Publications.
• Kahn, C., Quinn, S., & Roberds, W., Michael D. Bordo, Oyvind Eitrheim, Marc Flandreau and Jan F. Qvigstad (Ed.) (2016). Central Banks and Payment Systems: The Evolving Trade-off between Cost and Risk. Central Banks at a Crossroads: What Can We Learn from History? ( pp. 563-609). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
• Kahn, C., Pietro Catte, Andrea Gerali, Franco Passacantando (Ed.) (2015). Evolution of money and payment systems: private versus public institutions and the role of collateral. Money and Monetary Institutions after the Crisis: Proceedings of the Conference in Memory of Curzio Giannini ( pp. 163-188). Banca d'Italia.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W., Ritzer, George (Ed.) (2012). Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization England: John Wiley & Sons.
• Espinosa-Vega, M., Sole, J., Kahn, C., & Matta, R., Stijn Claessens, Douglas D Evanoff, George G. Kaufman and Laura Kodres (Ed.) (2011). Some Implications of Systemic Risk and the Design of Regulatory Architecture. Macrorudential Regulatory Policies: The New Road to Financial Stability World Scientific Publishing Co.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J., Mayes, D.G., and G.E. Wood (Ed.) (2007). Institutional Allocation of Bank Regulation: A Review. The Structure of Financial Regulation ( pp. 185-204). New York: Routledge.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J., George M. von Furstenberg, Volbert Alexander, and Jacques Melitz (Ed.) (2004). Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area. Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development and Stability Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kahn, C., George Tolley, Donald Kenkel and Robert Fabian (Ed.) (1994). Modeling of Choices with Uncertain Preferences. Health Values for Policy: An Economic Approach Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
• Kahn, C., & Asilis, C., B. Dutta et al. (Ed.) (1992). Semi-Stability in Game Theory: A Survey of Ugliness. Papers in Game Theory and Economic Applications: Procedings of An International Conference Held at the Indian Statistical Institute Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
• Kahn, C., Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman (Ed.) (1992). A Linear Programming Solution to the Slave Diet. Without Consent or Contract: Technical Papers on Slavery ( pp. 522-535). New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
• Kahn, C., Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman (Ed.) (1992). An Agency Theory Approach to Slave Incentives. Without Consent or Contract: Technical Papers on Slavery ( pp. 551-565). New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Conference Proceedings

• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2001). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? ( vol. 54, pp. 191-226). Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.
• Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1988). Demandable Debt as the Optimal Banking Contract. ( pp. 35-43). Garn Institute of Finance Symposium on Federal Insurance.

Other Publications

• Kahn, C. (2010). Editor, "Effective Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems: Maintaining financial plumbing" Henry Stewart Talks Series.
• Kahn, C. (1992). "What Discounts? Only Lawyers Will Gain from Airline Class-Action Suit" Atlanta Journal and Constitution, August 18, and "Airline Suit Settlement is a Gift for the Lawyers," Baltimore Evening Sun, Aug.
• Kahn, C. (1991). "Keep Banks on the Straight and Narrow," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 22.
• Kahn, C. (1990). Book Review: Roger Bowden's "Statistical Games and Human Affairs" for Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 28. September, 1990, pp. 1213-1215.

Presentations

• Antinolfi, G., Carapalla, F., Kahn, C., Martin, A., Mills, D., & Nosal, E. (2013). Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy. Review of Economic Dynamics/Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Conference on Money, Credit and Financi.
• Espinosa-Vega, M., Kahn, C., Matta, R., & Sole, J. (2010). Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture. Thirteenth Annual International Banking Conference, Chicago Federal Reserve Bank.
• Kahn, C. (2010). Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture. Thirteenth Annual International Banking Conference, Chicago Federal Reserve Bank.
• Kahn, C. (2009). Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment. Recent Developments in Theories of Money, Banking, and Asset Markets, University of Wisconsin – Madi.
• Kahn, C. (2009). Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment. Bank for International Settlements.
• Kahn, C. (2009). Offshore Settlement, Collateral and Interest Rates. New York Federal Reserve 4th annual Money and Payments Workshop.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2009). Liquidity, Payments, and Endogenous Financial Fragility. Workshop on Payments Systems, Collateral And Liquidity, Bank of Canada.
• Kahn, C., & Wagner, W. (2009). Lender of last resort, crisis resolution and liquidity policy. Centre for Banking Studies Research Forum: Lender of last resort, crisis resolution and liquidity po.
• Kahn, C. (2009). Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment. Chicago Federal Reserve Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance.
• Kahn, C. (2009). Offshore Settlement, Collateral, and Interest Rates. China International Conference in Finance.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2009). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. Korean Institute of Finance.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2009). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. Bank of Korea.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2009). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. Global Market Integration and Financial Crises, Organized by the Center for Asian Financial Markets.
• Kahn, C. (2009). Offshore Settlement, Collateral and Interest Rates. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
• Kahn, C. (2009). Financial Regulation in the Crisis and Beyond. Capital Markets Board of Turkey International Conference "Global Financial Markets and Future of R.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. "Payments and Networks," conference sponsored by the Laboratory for Aggregate Economics and Finance.
• Kahn, C. (2008). Offshore Settlement, Collateral and Interest Rates. Bank of Canada workshop "Payments Economics: Theory and Policy".
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. International Monetary Fund.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. CES-Ifo and Deutsche Bundesbank, Joint Conference on Liquidity: Concepts and Risks.
• Kahn, C. (2008). Offshore Settlement, Collateral and Interest Rates. Oxford Financial Research Summer Symposium.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Bank of Finland.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Bank of Norway.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2008). Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. Tilburg University.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2008). Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. Nottingham University.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Lancaster University.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2008). Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. European Central Bank.
• Kahn, C. (2007). Efficiency of Payment Systems. Reserve Bank of India.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Cass Business School, London City University.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. London School of Economics.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Oxford University.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Claremont-McKenna College.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. European Central Bank.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Cambridge University.
• Kahn, C. (2007). Liquidity Policy and Payment. Workshop on Liquidity Research, Bank of England.
• Kahn, C. (2007). Why Pay? The Economics of Payments and Payment Systems. Public Lecture, National University of Singapore.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2007). Credit and Identity Theft. Southern Methodist University.
• Kahn, C. (2007). A Theory of Payments. National University of Singapore.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2007). Credit and Identity Theft. National University of Singapore.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2006). Credit and Identity Theft. DePaul University.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2005). Credit and Identity Theft. University of Illinois at Chicago.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2005). Credit and Identity Theft. Conference at the University of Toronto, "Research on Money and Markets".
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2005). Credit and Identity Theft. FDIC Center for Financial Research 5th Annual Banking Research Conference, "Emerging Risks in Bankin.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2005). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. European Finance Association Annual Meeting.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2005). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Banco de Portugal conference "Financial Fragility and Bank Regulation".
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2005). Payment Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems. Bank of England Conference, "The Future of Payments".
• Kahn, C. (2004). Money is Privacy. Clarence Tow Conference on the Theory of Money, Transactions, and Financial Itermediation.
• Kahn, C., McAndrews, J., & Roberds, W. (2004). Money is Privacy. Models of Monetary Economics II: The Next Generation.
• Kahn, C. (2003). A Theory of Payments. Midwest Economic Theory Meetings, Bloomington, IN.
• Kahn, C. (2003). A Theory of Payments. Hightower Lecture, Emory Universtiy.
• Kahn, C. (2003). A Theory of Payments. Catholic University of Brasilia, Brazil.
• Kahn, C. (2003). Overview of Auctions Research. Research Group of the Treasury Department of Brazil, Brasilia, Brazil.
• Kahn, C. (2003). A Theory of Payments. Conference of the Society for Advancement of Economic Theory, Rodos, Greece.
• Kahn, C. (2003). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Wharton/CFS Conference.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2003). Payments Settlement under Limited Enforcement: Private versus Public Systems. Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting.
• Kahn, C. (2002). RESPA, Middlement and Regulation. Federal Trade Commission.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2002). Transferability, Finality and Debt Settlement. Purdue University.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2002). Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. Western Finance Association Annual Meetings, 2011.
• Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (2002). Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank Structure Conference.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2002). Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area. Fordham University.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2002). Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. American Finance Association Meetings.
• Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (2002). Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. American Finance Association Meetings.
• Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (2001). Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. Cowles Foundation, Yale University Conference.
• Kahn, C. (2001). Transferability, Finality, and Debt Settlement. Cleveland Federal Reserve payments conference.
• Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2001). Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank Structure Conference.
• Kahn, C. (2001). A Theory of Transactions Privacy. Federal Reserve Bank.
• Kahn, C., Pennacchi, G., & Sopranzetti, B. (2001). Bank Consolidation and Consumer Loan Rates. Federal Reserve Bank.
• Kahn, C., Roberds, W., & McAndrews, J. (2001). Settlement Risk under Gross and Net Settlement. ASSA Meetings.
• Kahn, C. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Washington University.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Tulane University.
• Kahn, C. (2000). Economic Functions of Referrals and Referral Fees. Federal Reserve Bank.
• Kahn, C., Pennacchi, G., & Sopranzetti, B. (2000). Bank Consolidation and consumer Loan Interest Rates. Federal Reserve Bank.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Federal Reserve Bank.
• Kahn, C. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Nuffield College of Oxford University.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Bank of England.
• Kahn, C. (2000). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Royal Holloway College, University of Surrey.
• Kahn, C., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1999). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Universite de Toulouse.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Bank of Norway.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? London School of Economics.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank Structure Conference.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Clarence Tow Conference on the Theory of Money, Transactions, and Financial Itermediation.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Federal Reserve Bank.
• Kahn, C. (1999). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. University of Texas.
• Kahn, C. (1999). Performace-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects. World Bank Seminar.
• Kahn, C. (1999). Research on Payments Systems. Cambridge University.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1998). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. I.T.A.M.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1998). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. Cleveland Federal Reserve/Journal of Money Credit and Banking Conference.
• Kahn, C. (1998). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. Carnegie Mellon University.
• Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1998). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. Society for Economic Dynamic Meetings.
• Kahn, C. (1998). On the Role of Bank Coalitions in the Provision of Liquidity. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank Structure Conference.
• Kahn, C., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1998). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Conference on Auctions/National Science Foundation.
• Kahn, C. (1998). On the Role of Bank Coalitions in the Provision of Liquidity. University of British Columbia.
• Kahn, C. (1997). Multi-goods Auctions with Private Values. Stockholm School of Economics.
• Kahn, C. (1997). Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives. Bank of Norway.
• Kahn, C. (1997). Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives. Western Economic Association Meetings.

Working Papers

• Fos, V., & Kahn, C. Governance through Threats of Intervention and Exit.