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"Who is in charge? A property rights perspective on stakeholder governance"

Peter G. Klein, Joseph T. Mahoney, Anita M. McGahan, and Christos N. Pitelis

 

First Author :

Peter G. Klein
Division of Applied Social Sciences & Director, McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership
Associate Professor, University of Missouri
Columbia, MO 65211
USA

573-882-7008

pklein@missouri.edu


Second Author :

Joseph T. Mahoney
Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business
1206 S. Sixth Street, MC 706
Champaign, IL 61820
USA

217-244-8257

josephm@illinois.edu

http://www.business.uiuc.edu/faculty/mahoney.html


Third Author :

Anita M. McGahan
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
Toronto, ON M5S3E6
Canada

amcgahan@rotman.utoronto.ca


Fourth Author :

Christos N. Pitelis
Centre for International Business and Management
Judge Business School, University of Cambridge
Cambridge CB21AG
UK

c.pitelis@jbs.cam.ac.uk

 
 
Abstract :
 
Debates on “shareholder” and “stakeholder” approaches to corporate governance often get bogged down in competing normative claims about economic rent streams, entitlements of different group members, fairness, and similar distributional issues. These concerns are important, but core economic issues in shareholder-stakeholder debates revolve around the positive analysis of property rights, transaction costs, ownership, and control. Going beyond the stylized assumptions of neoclassical economics, which assume away co-investment by the firm’s transactional and contractual partners, we show how theories of implicit and explicit contracting help us understand better joint investments and the creation of joint value. We call on scholars of Strategic Organization to embrace more robust theories of the firm and interfirm relations that take seriously the complex web of investments and residual claims that characterize team production and co-created value.
 
 
Manuscript Received : 2012
Manuscript Published : 2012
 
 
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