Working Papers Home

2015 Working Papers
2014 Working Papers
2013 Working Papers
2012 Working Papers
2011 Working Papers
2010 Working Papers
2009 Working Papers
2008 Working Papers
2007 Working Papers
2006 Working Papers
2005 Working Papers
2004 Working Papers
2003 Working Papers
2002 Working Papers
2001 Working Papers
2000 Working Papers

Search All Papers

JEL Classification

Past Working Papers (Prior to 2000)

Office of Research
Home Page

Information on
Submitting a Paper

"Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment"

Charles M. Kahn


First Author :

Charles M. Kahn
Department of Finance
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business
1206 S. Sixth Street, M/C 706
Champaign, IL 61820


Abstract :
This paper examines competition between private and public payments settlement systems, and examines the consequences of round-the-clock private payments arrangements on the competitiveness of public systems. Central to the issue is the role of collateral both as a requirement for participation in central bank sponsored payments arrangements and as the backing for private intermediary arrangements. The presence of private systems serves as a check on the ability of a monetary authority to tighten monetary policy. Round-the-clock systems are an example of a collateralsaving innovation that further pressures central bank pre-eminence in payments settlement.
Manuscript Received : 2010
Manuscript Published : October, 2009
This abstract has been viewed 1286 times.
Click here to view the full text of this paper.