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"Search Without Replacement"

Bart Taub

 

First Author :

Bart Taub
Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1206 S. Sixth Street, M/C 706
Champaign, IL 61820
USA

b-taub@uiuc.edu

http://www.business.uiuc.edu/faculty/taub.html

 
 
Abstract :
 
This note analyzes settings in which there is McCall-type search, but when searchers accept a job, the job is removed from the distribution of jobs as well as the searcher being removed. The basic intuition is that the best jobs get taken first, a kind of cream-skimming. This leaves a pool of worse jobs on subsequent rounds, adding to the pressure to accept lower-payoff jobs sooner rather that later. In its most extreme form, the number of initial jobs matches the number of workers and all jobs are accepted on the first round.
 
 
Manuscript Received : 2001
Manuscript Published : 2001
 
 
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